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We use panel data from El Salvador to investigate the intra-household allocation of labor as a risk-coping 
strategy. We show that adverse agricultural productivity shocks primarily increased male migration to the 
US with much smaller effects on female migration. This is consistent with the observation that the bulk of 
households allocated no women to the agricultural sector. These shocks also increased the number of hours 
that the household devoted to agricultural activities. These results do not contradict each other if one 
considers the possibility that the shocks had non-monotonic effects on shadow wages during the survey 
period. In contrast, damage sustained from the 2001 earthquakes exclusively stunted female migration. We 
argue that the reasons for this were that the earthquakes increased the demand for home production and that 
most men in our data are not engaged in domestic production at all. 
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1 Introduction
The development literature has long documented that households in poor countries, where in-
surance markets are far from complete, often employ ingenious methods to cope with risk. Ex-
amples of these “non-market mechanisms” include transferring funds within villages or families
(Townsend 1994; Udry 1994a; Yang and Choi 2006), depleting assets (Paxson 1992; Rosenzweig
and Wolpin 1993; Udry 1994b), increasing labor supply (Kochar 1999), gaining additional house-
hold members (Frankenberg, Smith and Thomas 2003) and migrating (Rosenzweg and Stark
1989; Paulson 2000; Halliday 2006).1 This paper addresses the role of the intra-household
allocation of labor in buﬀering the eﬀects of uninsured risk.
The reallocation of labor within the household in response to incentives that change across
states of nature raises an interesting possibility, namely, that exogenous shocks may induce a
redistribution of power within the family. In other words, although an adverse income or wealth
shock may reduce the household’s overall welfare in the utilitarian sense, it may also lead to an
improvement in the positions of females vis-a-vis males inside the family due to the impact of
the shock on relative shadow wages. What this suggests then is that interventions which are
1For a more thorough review of this literature, we refer the reader to Besley (1995).
2designed to improve the household’s ability to manage risk may also need to bear these intra-
household allocation issues in mind in order to bring about a Pareto improvement for all of the
household members. It is this point which separates this study from much of the other literature
on risk coping strategies in poor countries.
We concern ourselves with two primary questions in this paper. First, do exogenous shocks
induce a reallocation of labor within the household? Second, if so, how does this reallocation
aﬀect the demographic composition of the household? To shed light on the answers to these
questions, in the next section, we construct a simple partial equilibrium model of an agricultural
household in which it reallocates labor across diﬀerent sectors in response to changing incentives.
After that, in the next four sections, we conduct an empirical analysis of the eﬀects stochastic
shocks on the intra-household allocation of labor. In the penultimate section, we provide a
discussion of how our ﬁndings suggest that poorly planned policy interventions may not be
Pareto improving for all household members. The last section concludes.
2 Some Theoretical Considerations
We outline a simple model that describes how the intra-household allocation of labor can be used
to cope with exogenous shocks in the presence of skill diﬀerentials across genders. We assume
that there are a total of S discrete states of nature which we index by s. Next, we assume that
the household can reside in one of two locations: the north or the south. In addition, we assume
that the there three goods: a consumption good which is produced in the south denoted by Cs,a
consumption good that is produced in the north denoted by Ns and a good produced by a home
production technology in the south denoted by Hs.
3The household behaves as a unitary actor and, thus, maximizes the expectation of a single
utility function: E[u(Cs,N s,H s)] which we assume to be increasing and concave in both of its
arguments. It is important to emphasize that, although we are considering intra-household
allocation issues in this paper, the simple unitary model that we consider here will serve as a
perfectly adequate guide for us when we conduct our empirical analysis. However, later on
in Section 7, we do provide a discussion of what our empirical ﬁndings may imply for intra-
household bargaining within the collective models of household decision making of Chiappori
(1992) or Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori and Lechene (1994).
The household is endowed with a measure of female and male labor, each of which is normal-
ized to unity. After observing the state of nature, the household allocates male and female labor
either to the production of C, N or H. Male labor is denoted by the super-script M and female
labor is denoted by the super-script F. Respectively, we let {mM
s ,l M
s ,h M




denote the household’s allocation of male and female labor to these three activities in state s.
Finally, it is important to note that there are migration costs in this model as there is a cost
and beneﬁt to marginal utility of shifting household members across sectors. However, we do
not model any other migration costs as this would further complicate the model by introducing
dynamics.2
The household has the following production technologies. In the N-sector, it is given by
wj,smj
s for j = M or F where wj
s denotes the northern wage. The production function in the
C-sector is given by λ(lM
s ,l F
s ,ψ s) where ψs is a stochastic production shock. This technology
models agricultural production in the south. Finally, the production function in the H-sector
2While a dynamic model would certainly be more realistic, we do not believe that it would oﬀer any additional
insights.
4is given by η(hM
s ,h F
s ,ε s) where εs is a stochastic production shock. This technology models
activities such as housework, child rearing and, perhaps, home maintenance. We assume that λ
and η are increasing and concave in male and female labor.
Adopting the notation that uX is the partial derivative of the utility function with respect to
commodity X and that λM, λF, ηM and ηF are the partial derivatives of the production functions
with respect to the male and female inputs, the optimal (interior) allocations of female and male

















for j ∈ {M,F} and s ∈ {1,...,S}. (2)
These two conditions constitute a set of S contingency plans for all states of nature that the
household will use to buﬀer the impact of risk. This will involve transferring labor from sectors
with low demand and/or productivity to sectors with high demand and/or productivity. If
we take these conditions together with the constraints that lj
s + mj
s + hj
s =1for all s and
j, we obtain the household’s (reduced form) labor demand system lj
s = fj(εs,ψs,w M,s,w F,s),
mj
s = gj(εs,ψs,w M,s,w F,s) and hj
s = mj(εs,ψ s,w M,s,w F,s) for all s and j.
One interesting feature of this model is that it is capable of capturing some complicated
labor supply responses to stochastic shocks. To see this, we implicitly diﬀerentiate (the inverse
of) equation (1) with respect to lj
s for j ∈ {M,F} and ψs while holding the amount of labor
5allocated to the H-sector constant and assuming that uNC =0 .3 If we drop the arguments of
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wj .4 Note that our assumptions imply that ∆ > 0.T h e ﬁrst term in
brackets, which we call the “Consumption Eﬀect,” will be negative provided that λψ > 0.T h e
intuition of this is that if the household experiences a positive shock to the production of C in
some state of nature then its labor demand in that sector will decrease. The second term, which
we call the “Productivity Eﬀect,” will be positive provided that λjψ > 0.T h i s e ﬀect tells us that
if a shock increases the marginal product of labor in the C-sector in a given state of nature then
the household will tend to allocate additional labor to that sector. It is important to realize that
it is reasonable to expect both λψ > 0 and λjψ > 0 so that a beneﬁcial (adverse) productivity
shock will positively (negatively) impact both the level of production and the marginal returns
to labor. If and when this occurs, then there will be counter-veiling forces aﬀecting the net
impact of the shock.
Another important feature of this model which warrants some discussion is corner solutions.
3Otherwise, the comparative static becomes too complicated. Allowing for these additional complications
does not add any more insights.


























and then substituting for λ
2
j using the ﬁrst order condition in equation (1).
6These are important in our model because they will have implications for how the eﬀects of
stochastic shocks diﬀer across genders. To better see this, consider a household that is at an
interior allocation for females in the N and H sectors, but is at a corner for males in the sense















Now suppose that the household gets hit by a shock that reduces the level of its production of
H but leaves marginal productivity in this sector unchanged. This will tend to increase the
marginal utility of H and, hence, the ﬁrst term of condition (4). To restore equilibrium, the
household can increase the amount of female labor allocated to the H-sector. However, unless
the shock is suﬃciently bad that it reverses the inequality on the right side of the condition, it
will leave male labor in that sector unchanged at zero. This suggests that shocks should have
smaller eﬀects on the labor supply of a particular gender when households are more likely to be
at corners for that gender.
3D a t a
3.1 BASIS
Our primary data source is the BASIS Panel from El Salvador which was ﬁelded by the Ohio State
University and the Fundación Salvadoreño para Desarollo Económico y Social (FUSADES).5 We
employ three waves of the panel from 1997, 1999 and 2001. The data contain identiﬁers which
5For a more thorough discussion of these data including an analysis of panel attrition, we refer the reader to
Halliday (2006).
7enable us to track households across time.
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics and deﬁnitions for our variables on migration, hours
worked in various household activities, land holdings and economic shocks.6 Because the agri-
cultural shocks are only available for 1999 and 2001, most of our regressions only use these
years. However, the 1997 data was still used in these regressions to construct lags of some of
our variables.
Some additional details need to be given on the data on hours worked. These data come
from a component of the BASIS survey that listed numerous household activities and then
asked, “Cuánto tiempo trabajó en esa actividad?” or “How much time did he (she) work in that
activity?” We employ data for three activities. The ﬁr s ti sw h a tw ec a l lﬁeld labor. In the
s u r v e y ,t h i si sd e ﬁned as “Trabajo agrícola para venta o autoconsumo” or “Agricultural work
for sale or auto-consumption.” We call the second, livestock labor, which the survey deﬁnes
as “Cuidado de animales para venta o autoconsumo” or “Care of animals for sale or auto-
consumption.”7 Finally, we call the third, domestic labor, which the survey deﬁnes as “Labores
domésticas (preparación de alimentos, limpieza, cuido de niños y enfermos)” which, in English,
is “Domestic labor (preparation of food, cleaning, care of children and the sick).”
Our stochastic shocks come from two sources: poor agricultural conditions in 1999 and 2001
6Two points need mentioning. First, we deﬁne a migrant to be a household member that is residing in either
the United States or Canada at the time of the survey where a household member is deﬁned to be someone
who is tied to the household by blood or marriage. Second, while it is impossible to know whether a migrant
was residing in the United States or Canada, we believe that it is reasonable to assume that the vast majority
of migrants are residing in the United States. Because of this, for the remainder of the paper, we refer to all
migrants as residing in the United States.
7It is important to note that the BASIS survey does not explicitly say that what we deﬁne as “ﬁeld labor”
constitutes work such as planting, tending to and/or harvesting crops. However, the survey does list caring for
livestock as a separate activity from what they call agricultural activity. Accordingly, we infer that agricultural
labor as deﬁned by the survey does not include hours spent tending to livestock and, thus, includes primarily
activities which involve crops.
8and the earthquakes of 2001. The agricultural shocks are dummy variables indicating income
loss from either harvest or livestock loss.8 Our earthquake shock is an index corresponding to
the (log of) monetary value of damage sustained from the 2001 earthquakes.
As in Udry (1994a and 1994b), all of our shocks are based on self-reports. Some recent
papers have shied away from self-reported shocks and, instead, have relied on variables that are
supposedly more exogenous like rainfall. However, rainfall data does have many disadvantages.
For example, in a country as small as El Salvador, there may not be suﬃcient regional variation.
More importantly, rainfall data is collected at some regional level such as a department or a
municipio and this precludes the use of many location dummies which raises many omitted
variables concerns. In contrast, our shocks do vary within geographic units.9 Finally, we
provide evidence in this paper and in Halliday (2006) which mitigates many of the endogeneity
concerns that have been raised with the self-reported shocks.
Table 2 provides information on the demographic composition of households in the BASIS
data. This demographic information excludes all migrants. The categories in this table were
used to construct demographic controls in our regressions.
8Due to changes in survey design in the years 1999 and 2001, the construction of the harvest and livestock
loss dummies warrants some discussion. In 1999, the household was deﬁned to have experienced a harvest loss if
they reported that they lost all or part of their harvest and that this event caused them to lose income. In 2001,
the household was deﬁned to have experienced a harvest loss if they reported that the value of their harvest was
less than normal as a consequence of a drought which occurred in 2001. Unfortunately, the 1999 survey did not
solicit the actual cause of the harvest loss and, hence, it is not possible to have comparable measures of harvest
losses in 1999 and 2001. To address this issue, in Halliday (2006), we estimated our models separately for 1999
and 2001 to ensure that the results were comparable in the two years. They were.
9For example, Halliday (2006) provides nonparametric density estimates of earthquake damage within depart-
ments and shows that there is considerable intra-regional variation.
93.2 IPUMS
We also employ data on a sub-sample of Salvadoran migrants from the 5% micro-sample of the
2000 United States Census (Ruggles, et al. 2004). We deﬁne a Salvadoran migrant as one who
resides in El Salvador ﬁve years prior to being interviewed. There are 5251 such individuals in
the 2000 Census. Because we are interested in using these data to quantify wage diﬀerentials by
gender, we further restrict the sample to working-aged people which we deﬁne to be 20 years or
older. This further reduces the sample to 3738. We employ variables on wages, age, years in the
United States, employment status, citizenship status and education. Wages were constructed
by dividing the respondent’s total wage income in the year by the number of hours per week that
the respondent reported to work multiplied by 52. Summary statistics are reported in Table 3.
4 Risk and the Gender Composition of Migrant Flows
We begin our empirical analysis by investigating how exogenous shocks in El Salvador impact
the gender composition of migrant ﬂows. Our benchmark regression equation is similar to that
















h,t for j ∈ {M,F} (5)
where ∆M
j
h,t is the change in the stock of male or female migrants across time periods, ζ
j
t
is a year eﬀect, ωh,t is a vector of exogenous shocks such as the harvest and livestock loss
dummies and the earthquake damage index, Rh is a set of location dummies and Xh,t is a set
of demographic controls which were discussed in Table 2. Two sets of location dummies are
10employed: department dummies of which there are 14 and municipio dummies of which there are
173.10 To address the obvious endogenity concern that migration will have a contemporaneous
impact on the household’s demographic structure, we use lags of Xh,t. We estimate the model
using an ordered logit estimator with the 2001 and 1999 waves of the BASIS panel. The
advantage of the ordered logit model is that it uses ancillary parameters which enable us to handle
the dependent variable in a ﬂexible manner. To account for the possibility of correlations across
observations within municipios, we cluster all standard errors by municipio. Table 4 reports our
results for male migration and Table 5 reports our results for female migration.
The ﬁrst column of Table 4 displays estimation results when the dependent variable is total
migration (i.e. the sum of male and female migration) as a reference. We see that the agricultural
shocks had a positive and signiﬁcant impact on migration, whereas the earthquakes had a negative
and signiﬁcant impact on migration. The explanation that we give in Halliday (2006) for this
result is that adverse agricultural conditions in El Salvador expanded the north-south wage gap
and, thereby, increased the incentives for northward migration, whereas the earthquakes increased
the demand for labor at home which was met by a reduction in migration. In that paper, we
explored the possibility that the earthquakes stunted migration because they disrupted migration
ﬁnancing, but the preponderance of evidence that we uncovered did not support this alternative
hypothesis.
In the second column of the table, we provide a simple identiﬁcation check. First, we
take the shocks from the 2001 (1999) wave of the panel and merge them into the 1999 (2001)
wave. We call these “counterfactual” shocks. We then estimate the speciﬁcation from the ﬁrst
10In fact, there are 262 municipios in El Salvador, but only 173 of these are present in our data due to the
small sample sizes in the BASIS data. In addition, for some of the regressions in this paper, some municipio
dummies were dropped due to collinearity with the agricultural shock dummies.
11column using these counterfactual shocks while omitting the actual shocks. The central idea
of this exercise is that if households have time-invariant characteristics that are systematically
correlated with both migration and the shocks then these counterfactual shocks should pick up
false treatments.11 What we see is that the F-tests at the bottom of the column cannot reject
the null that the counterfactual shocks all have zero coeﬃcients which mitigates some of these
omitted variables concerns.
Columns three through six of Table 4 use male migration as the dependent variable. In
all four columns, we see that adverse agricultural shocks had a positive and signiﬁcant impact
on migration. All tests of joint signiﬁcance had p-values less than 10%. In addition, it is
i m p o r t a n tt op o i n to u tt h a ti nc o l u m ns i xw eu s emunicipio dummies and, while the agricultural
shock dummies are no longer individually signiﬁcant, they are still jointly signiﬁcant at the
10% level.12 We must emphasize that, while the standard errors on the agricultural shocks
are substantially higher, the point estimates are broadly in-line with the others in the table.
This substantially mitigates concerns of omitted variables bias.13 Interestingly and in stark
contrast to the ﬁrst column, we see that there is no relationship between the earthquakes and
male migration.
Turning to the results for female migration in Table 5, we see a substantially diﬀerent picture.
11These omitted variable biases may arise if the shocks were non-randomly assigned to households that either
had weak ties to the United States or were poorer. In both scenarios, the shocks would have been assigned to
households that had unobserved characteristics that made them less likely to migrate.
12While this procedure does mitigate omitted variables concerns, it also eliminates a substantial amount of
v a r i a t i o ni nt h es h o c k s-m u c ho fw h i c hi sm e a n i n g f u lvariation. As such it is unreasonable to expect high
t-statistics on the agricultural shocks as this is a highly ineﬃcient procedure. Because of this, the fact that we
have such a low p-value on our F-tests is a strong testament to our claim that our agricultural shocks are probably
not picking up omitted variables.
13For example, the areas in El Salvador with long histories of migration to the US are in the rural northern
and eastern parts of the country which were hit hardest by the civil war. It might be reasonable to expect that
these areas also have a higher prevalence of risky agricultural activities which could create a spurious relationship
between the agricultural shocks and migration. For a more comprehensive discussion of some of these omitted
variables concerns, see Halliday (2006).
12Now the relationship between the agricultural shocks and migration is more muted than in the
previous table as can seen by the lower point estimates and F-tests in the bottom of the table.
In addition, we now see a large, negative and statistically signiﬁcant relationship between the
earthquakes and migration. In fact, the point estimates in this table are substantially larger
than the estimate in the ﬁrst column of the previous table where the dependent variable was total
migration. Finally, the earthquake eﬀects are greatest when we include the municipio dummies
which, once again, mitigates many omitted variables concerns.
We conclude this section by addressing the additional identiﬁcation consideration that the
terrorist attacks of September 11 may have had an impact on our conclusions. We do not believe
that they have. The primary reason is that the year dummy in the regression equation should
adequately control for any macroeconomic shocks that occurred in 2001. Even if there were
some heterogeneity in the eﬀects of the terrorist attacks that is not fully dealt with by the year
dummy, it would have to be systematically correlated with our shocks to bias our results. We
do not see why this should be the case.
5G e n d e r D i ﬀerences in Wages and Employment
In this section, we investigate gender diﬀerences in wages and employment both in El Salvador
and among Salvadoran migrants in the United States.14 Our goal is to gain a better under-
14There is a large literature on gender diﬀerences in wages and employment in both developing and developed
countries. For an excellent overview of this literature, we refer the reader to Mammen and Paxson (2000).
Some of this literature has focused on determining whether these observed diﬀerentials are the consequence
of productivity/skill diﬀerences across genders or discrimination. Unfortunately, understanding the role that
productivity diﬀerences play in determining wage and employment disparities across genders has, to a large
degree, been hampered by a dearth of data on individual productivity. One notable exception, however, is Foster
and Rosenzweig (1996) who do have piece-rate data and conclude that women tend to be engaged in diﬀerent
activities than men because of diﬀerences in comparative advantage across genders and statistical discrimination.
That they ﬁnd an important role for productivity diﬀerences (albeit in a diﬀerent context) does lend credence to
13standing of how labor is allocated across sectors in Salvadoran households with the ultimate aim
of better understanding how the eﬀects of stochastic shocks should diﬀer by gender. We do so
using a sample of Salvadorans from the US Census and as well as the BASIS data.
5.1 In the United States
We now investigate male-female diﬀerentials in wages and employment status among Salvadoran
migrants in the US. Looking at Table 3, two facts emerge. First is that the average US wage
of Salvadoran women, including women who are not in the labor force, is $2.16 less than a
Salvadoran male. Second is that a far greater number of Salvadoran women (46.39%) report
being out of the labor force than Salvadoran men (25.02%) suggesting that this wage gap is driven
l a r g e l yb yd i ﬀerences in labor force participation.15 To give the reader a more comprehensive
picture of these wage gaps, we plot the cumulative density functions (CDF) of wages for men
and women in Figure 1. It can be seen that the male CDF dominates the female CDF and that
the largest discrepancies exist when wages are zero.
We can combine this with migration information from Table 1 to get a sense of how many
members in each household are both living abroad and in the labor force. According to Table
1, the average number of female and male migrants per household is 0.19 and 0.36, respectively.
Using the labor force participation rates from the US census, we obtain that there are a total
of 0.19 * 0.5361 = 0.1019 females per household that are working migrants. The corresponding
number for males is 0.36 * 0.7498 = 0.2699. These calculations suggest that there are roughly
our model which assumes that labor allocation diﬀerences across genders are due to comparative advantage.
15These discrepancies most likely reﬂect diﬀerent migration motives among men, who generally migrate for
economic reasons, and women, who generally migrate to be reunited with their families. See Donato (1994) for
a discussion of these motives in the case of Mexican migration.
142.6 times as many working male migrantst h a nf e m a l em i g r a n t sp e rh o u s e h o l d .
In Table 6, we estimate wage regressions. The explanatory variables are gender, age, ex-
perience in the US, education and citizenship status. In the ﬁrst four columns, we used OLS.
In the ﬁfth and sixth columns, we estimated a Tobit model and the censored least absolute
deviations (CLAD) regression of Powell (1984).16 It can be seen that even after we adjust for
a number of potentially confounding variables, men still earn more than two dollars per hour
more than women in the OLS regressions. In the last two columns, which display the results of
censored regressions, the gap is $4.65 in column 5 and $3.33 in column 6.17 T h ef a c tt h a tf e m a l e
wages in the US are so low makes sense of the fact that so many households in our data choose
corner solutions for their allocation of female labor abroad. In addition, when one considers
the discussion of condition (4) in the theoretical section, the high prevalence of these corner
solutions also makes sense of the observation in the previous section that the agricultural shocks
had substantially larger impacts on men.18
16We prefer the OLS results and the CLAD results to the Tobit results. One reason why we like the OLS results
is that we are interested in knowing the impact of gender on average wages which includes both the extensive
margin (i.e. labor force participation) and the intensive margin (i.e. wage diﬀerentials among earners). In
fact, the fact that the censoring is substantially higher for women is indicative that the wages that Salvadoran
women would have earned had they entered the labor force was lower than their reservation wages. A simple
OLS regression conveniently summarizes this. In addition, Tobit models typically rely heavily on homoskedastic
disturbances and when this fails their performance can be weak. Both OLS and CLAD are robust to failures of
homoskedasticity. For additional opinions on this, we refer the reader to Deaton (1997).
17We bootstrapped the standard errors in column 6 when CLAD was employed using 100 replications.
18While these results do suggest that economic considerations play an important role in the household’s al-
location problem, it is also important to mention that prevailing social mores in Central America about the
vulnerability of women may also mean that the costs of migration, as perceived by the household, may be sub-
stantially higher for women (Curran and Rivero-Fuentes 2003).
155.2 In El Salvador
We now turn to an investigation into how the distribution of hours worked in various household
activities diﬀers across genders in El Salvador.19 The activities that we consider are ﬁeld, livestock
and domestic labor and were discussed in Section 3.1. We calculate CDF’s for the total number
of hours devoted to each of these activities by an individual during the survey year by gender.
For the sake of clarity, it is important to emphasize that in contrast to the bulk of this paper
where we work with household aggregates, these ﬁgures display hours worked per year at the
level of the individual. The results of this exercise are displayed in Figures 2, 3 and 4 for ﬁeld,
livestock and domestic labor, respectively. These results indicate, perhaps not surprisingly,
that ﬁeld labor is by-and-large (but not entirely) men’s work and that domestic labor is almost
exclusively women’s work. They also indicate that men are marginally more likely than women
to be engaged in livestock labor.
These ﬁgures elucidate the previous section’s results in two ways. First, given that most
households were at a corner solution in which no women were engaged in either ﬁeld activities
in El Salvador or wage labor in the US, we would expect the agricultural shocks to have smaller
eﬀects on female migration as we have seen. Second, given that Figure 4 suggests that the home
is the woman’s domain, it is not surprising that the earthquakes, which ostensibly increased the
demand for home production, were met exclusively by a reduction in female migration.
6 Risk and the Intra-Household Allocation of Labor
19 In the Salvadoran data, we focus on hours worker as opposed to wages due to the fact that in developing
countries a large proportion of labor is not in the wage sector.
16We now investigate how stochastic shocks induced a re-allocation of labor within the household
in El Salvador. We deﬁne H
j,s
h,t to be the number of labor hours devoted to sector s by all
members of household h of gender j in year t where the sectors are ﬁeld, livestock and domestic
activity. We also deﬁne h
j,s
h,t completely analogously to H
j,s
h,t except that h
j,s
h,t is the number of
hours devoted to a particular labor activity per adult male or female (i.e. total hours worked by
the household divided by the number of adult men or women).20 We then estimate a similar




h,tas the dependent variables. Tables 7





Each regression includes a set of department dummies and (lagged) demographic controls. A
perusal of the tables reveals several interesting results.
First, we consider the coeﬃcient estimates on the earthquake damage index. In the last
column of both tables, we see that households that were hit hard by the earthquakes also expe-
rienced a dramatic increase in the number of hours devoted to domestic labor by women. The
proper interpretation of the point estimate in Table 7 is that a 1% increase in earthquake dam-
age is associated with an increase in total hours devoted to domestic labor by women of 1.54.
This implies that a household that was hit three times harder by the earthquakes than another
experienced a 462 hour increase in hours devoted to domestic work by women during the year,
on average! In contrast, in column ﬁve of both tables, we see that the earthquakes had no eﬀect
on male hours devoted to domestic activities. Finally, we note that the estimate on earthquake
damage in column four of both tables, where the dependent variable is the change in livestock
hours worked by women, is negative and moderately signiﬁcant suggesting that the earthquakes
20We deﬁne an adult to be anyone 16 years of age or older.
17may have induced a substitution away from livestock production towar d sh o m ep r o d u c t i o n .
Next, we consider the eﬀects of the two agricultural shocks on hours. In both tables, we see
that harvest losses had large, positive and signiﬁcant eﬀects on ﬁeld hours for men. We also see
that livestock losses had similar eﬀects on livestock hours for both men and women, although in
Table 8, the eﬀects on male hours are no longer signiﬁcant. However, livestock losses had no
eﬀects on ﬁeld hours, nor did harvest losses have any eﬀects on livestock hours for either men or
women.
These results may seem counter-intuitive at ﬁrst. The reason for this is that the harvest
and livestock shocks presumably lowered marginal productivity in agricultural activities in El
Salvador which would also tend to reduce (shadow) wages. One would expect that such a
productivity shock would, in turn, induce a substitution away from (not towards) agricultural
activities. However, it is important to mention that a similar result can be found in Frankenberg,
Smith and Thomas (2003) who show that there was a tendency for labor supply to increase in
the aftermath of the Indonesian ﬁnancial crisis despite the fact that it caused a 40% reduction
in real wages in the formal sector.
Do these ﬁndings pose a paradox? The comparative static in equation (3) shows that adverse
agricultural shocks can increase labor demand in the agricultural sector - provided that the
consumption eﬀect dominates any adverse eﬀects on the marginal product of labor. However, in
this scenario, the shadow wage in agriculture should increase due to higher labor demand which
is seemingly inconsistent with the observation that household members migrated in response to
adverse agricultural shocks.
One can resolve this paradox if one considers the possibility that the eﬀects of the shocks
18on shadow wages diﬀered within the survey period. First, suppose that the shock initially
reduced the marginal product of labor in such a way that the productivity eﬀect dominated the
consumption eﬀect in equation (3). This would reduce labor demand and shadow wages. In
response, members migrate out of the household. This then places upward pressure on shadow
wages and, thus, induces the household to allocate more labor to agriculture. Second, backwards
bending labor supply curves may also shed light on this puzzle. Suppose that the net eﬀect of the
shocks were such that the consumption eﬀects dominated the productivity eﬀects so that labor
demand in agriculture increased in response to the shock. In the presence of backwards bending
labor supply curves, this would actually reduce the shadow wage and, thus, create additional
pressures to migrate.21 As members migrate in response to this wage decrease, the shadow wage
would then start to increase.
7 Policy Interventions and Intra-Household Allocation
The empirical results that we have presented paint a picture in which Salvadoran households
respond to exogenous shocks in ways that may place women in a more prominent role within the
household. The agricultural shocks primarily pushed men to the US, whereas the earthquakes
exclusively stunted female migration. In either case, sex-ratios within the household became
more skewed towards females in the aftermath of the shock. While it is diﬃcult to say pre-
cisely how these shocks impacted the household’s sharing rule in the sense of Chiappori (1992)
21Many readers may express surprise that labor supply curves would bend backwards in a poor country such
as El Salvador. However, subsistence considerations can actually create this phenomenon. To see this, consider
a simple model in which the household earns Y = wL but needs to maintain Y above Y to survive. In this
world, a suﬃciently large decrease in wages actually induces more labor supply. We thank Raymond Robertson
for pointing this out to us.
19or Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori and Lechene (1994), we believe that it is reasonable to
conjecture that these shocks shifted intra-household bargaining power towards the women of the
household. To the extent that recent research by Duﬂo (2003) has suggested that increases in
the bargaining power of females results in better outcomes for children, the household’s use of
migration as a risk coping strategy may also have additional beneﬁts once these intra-household
allocation issues are also considered. What this suggests is that policy makers who design in-
terventions to mitigate the eﬀects of uninsured risk may also want to bear these intra-household
allocation issues in mind.
To ﬁx ideas, consider a hypothetical response to the earthquakes in which cash is transferred
to either the household head or his spouse.22 Chiappori (1992) makes the point that while such
a program will certainly expand the household’s utility possibility frontier it need not result in
a Pareto improvement for all household members. This can be illustrated within the collective
model of household decision making with two household members (husband and wife) who both
have egoistic preferences. Let yM and yF denote the respective transfers to husband and wife.
These transfers, in turn, determine the household’s sharing rule, ϕ(yM,y F), which is the portion
of the pie that goes to the wife.. For the sake of simplicity, we abstract from labor supply. In
this case the household’s decision process reduces to a two-stage procedure where ﬁrst the pie
is divided between household members and then each member maximizes their egoistic utility
functions subject to their individual budget constraints.
Following Chiappori (1992), we can write the indirect utility functions of husband and wife
22Alternatively, we could have considered competing policies where either (i) cash is transfered to women or (ii)
men are paid to participate in the reconstruction. The basic insights of our discussion would remain the same,










The primary diﬀerence between the indirect utility functions vi(.,.) and V i(.) for i ∈ {M,F} is
that the former implicitly takes account of the sharing rule. The impact of the cash transfer on












ϕ (ϕ(yM,y F))ϕF(yM,y F) (9)
where V F
ϕ (ϕ(yM,y F)) is the derivative of V F(.) with respect to the sharing rule and ϕM(yM,y F)
and ϕF(yM,y F) are the partial derivatives of the sharing rule with respect to the male and
female cash transfers. While V F
ϕ (ϕ(yM,y F)) > 0 since indirect utility functions are increasing
in income, the terms ϕM(yM,y F) and ϕF(yM,y F) m a yb ep o s i t i v eo rn e g a t i v ed e p e n d i n go nh o w
the transfers impact bargaining power within the household.
This theoretical digression raises an interesting point. The earthquakes presumably shifted
the household’s utility possibility frontier inwards by depleting household resources, but may have
brought about a relative improvement of women vis a vis men inside the household. If a policy
intervention is designed poorly in that it ignores these intra-household allocation considerations,
it may actually erode away these improvements despite pushing the household’s utility possibility
21frontier outwards.
8C o n c l u s i o n s
We investigated how the intra-household allocation of labor responds to stochastic shocks within
the context of an equilibrium model of a farm household using panel data from El Salvador. We
showed that adverse shocks in the agricultural sector were met by increases in the number of male
migrants living in the US and increases in male hours devoted to agricultural activities. The
ﬁrst ﬁnding is consistent with data on labor supply from the US and El Salvador which showed
that most households did not allocate any women either to wage labor abroad or to agricultural
activities at home. We argued that both of these ﬁndings are compatible with each other if
one allows for the possibilities that shocks had non-monotonic eﬀects on shadow wages within
the survey period. In contrast, damage sustained by households due to the 2001 earthquakes
had a large negative eﬀect on female migration, but had absolutely no eﬀect on male migration.
We also showed that the earthquakes were met by a dramatic increase in the number of hours
that women devoted to domestic labor, but had no impact on male domestic hours. This is
consistent with the ﬁnding in our data that over 90% of all households do not allocate any males
to domestic activities. Thus, it appears that it was the women who picked up the pieces left by
the disaster.
One implication of this work is that exogenous shocks induce re-allocations within the house-
hold in ways that may alter bargaining power of individuals. Within a collective model of
household decision making al aChiappori (1992) or Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori and
Lechene (1994), this would potentially change the way that resources are allocated within the
22household. A study into this issue would be interesting as it would elucidate an additional chan-
nel through which migration and other risking-coping strategies can impact household welfare.
This is a challenging topic. First, it requires adequate data so that consumption can be assigned
to individuals. Second, identiﬁcation is apt to be very diﬃcult. For example, although we
have good reasons to believe that the exogenous shocks that we consider in this paper aﬀected
intra-household bargaining power, they also had large eﬀects on the household’s total budget
constraint which would also aﬀect resource allocation. Disentangling these two eﬀects from each
other should be challenging.
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Field Hours1 Total number of hours in the year that household
members devoted to ﬁeld labor
1065.33
(1584.32)






Livestock Hours1 Total number of hours in the year that household
members devoted to caring for livestock
474.17
(928.88)






Domestic Hours1 Total number of hours in the year that household
members devoted to domestic labor
4533.91
(3439.47)







Total land holdings (in manzanas) of the household












Quakedamage3 Cost of all household damage due to the 2001
earthquakes (in 1992 $, in logs)
4.64
(3.80)
1Data is from 1997, 1999 and 2001. Sample size is 2008.
2Data is from 1999 and 2001. Sample size is 1365.
3Data is from 2001. Sample size is 689.
27Table 2: Basis Data - Demographic Variables


























∗Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
Data are from the 1997, 1999 and 2001 waves of
the survey.


















- Employed 69.39% 45.66%
- Unemployed 5.58% 7.95%
- Not in labor force 25.02% 46.39%
Citizenship Status
- Born abroad of American Citizens 0.20% 0.44%
- Naturalized Citizen 4.98% 5.00%
- Not a citizen 94.82% 94.56%
Education
- None 13.76% 14.46%
- 1 to 4 Years 8.04% 7.95%
- 5 to 8 Years 25.70% 24.04%
- 9 Years 11.36% 9.58%
- 10 Years 2.89% 2.83%
- 11 Years 3.08% 3.19%
- 12 Years 22.95% 22.47%
- 1 to 3 Years of College 7.75% 10.06%
- 4 or more Years of College 4.48% 5.42%
∗The data in this table come from a sub-sample of Salvadorans in the
US who were residing in El Salvador in 1995 who were at least 20 years
old. Standard deviation in parentheses.
29Table 4: Migratory Responses to Adverse Shocks: Male Migration





















































Demographic Variables1 No No No Yes Yes Yes
Municipio Dummies No No No No No Yes
Department Dummies No No No No Yes No
Decomposition? All All Male Male Male Male

























Pseudo R2 0.0078 0.0039 0.0070 0.0080 0.0237 0.0601
Households 1265 1244 1265 1265 1265 1265
∗This table contains estimates from an ordered logit model where the dependent
variable is male migration.
∗∗All standard errors allow for clustering within municipios.
∗∗∗t-statistics reported in parentheses.
1The demographic controls that were used are indicators for the number of household
members at home within certain age and gender brackets reported in Table 2.
2p-values are reported below each F-statistic.
3In this column, the dependent variable is the sum of male and female migration.
4In this column, we employed the "counterfactual" shocks described in Section 4.
30Table 5: Migratory Responses to Adverse Shocks: Female Migration





































Demographic Variables1 No Yes Yes Yes
Municipio Dummies No No No Yes
Department Dummies No No Yes No

















Pseudo R2 0.0082 0.0130 0.0170 0.0769
Households 1265 1265 1265 1265
∗This table contains estimates from an ordered logit model where the dependent
variable is female migration.
∗∗All standard errors allow for clustering within municipios.
∗∗∗t-statistics reported in parentheses.
1The demographic controls that were used are indicators for the number of household
members at home within certain age and gender brackets. Details are in Section 2.3.
2p-values are reported below each F-statistic.
31T a b l e6 :U SW a g eR e g r e s s i o n s
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )




























































Education Dummies? No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Citizenship Status Dummies? No No No Yes Yes Yes
Estimation Method OLS OLS OLS OLS Tobit CLAD
R2 0.0327 0.0469 0.0548 0.0571 0.0216 0.0637
N 3738 3738 3738 3738 3738 3738
∗These regressions use the same data as Table 3. t-ratios are in parentheses.
32Table 7: Adverse Shocks and Hours Worked
∆ Field Hours ∆ Livestock Hours ∆ Domestic Hours
Men Women Men Women Men Women





















































R2 0.0384 0.0207 0.0381 0.0405 0.0203 0.0644
Households 1265 1265 1265 1265 1265 1265
∗This table contains OLS estimates where the dependent variable is the change in hours worked in a
particular sector broken down by gender. All regressions contain lagged demographic controls and
department dummies.
∗∗All standard errors allow for clustering within municipios.
∗∗∗t-statistics reported in parentheses.
33Table 8: Adverse Shocks and Hours Worked
∆ Field Hours ∆ Livestock Hours ∆ Domestic Hours
Men Women Men Women Men Women





















































R2 0.0247 0.0129 0.0403 0.0370 0.0292 0.0429
Households 1265 1265 1265 1265 1265 1265
∗This table contains OLS estimates where the dependent variable is the change in hours worked per
adult male or female in a particular sector broken down by gender. All regressions contain lagged
demographic controls and department dummies.
∗∗All standard errors allow for clustering within municipios.
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